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) 
[L. A. No. 29441. In Bank. Apr. 15, 1968.] 
GAIL ELKIND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SYLVAN 
BYCK, JR., Defendant and Respondent. 
[la, Ib] Parent and Child-Support-Uniform Act-Effect of 
Lump Sum Settlement.-A mother awarded custody of her 
minor child in a Georgia divorce and now resident in New 
York was entitled under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1670 et seq) to apply to 
the California courts for fair and reasonable child support 
from the father, where, although the Georgia decree had in-
corporated a once-for-all lump-sum settlement for child sup-
port, as permitted in Georgia, Georgia's uniform act ,at that 
time provided that the duties of support were those of the 
state where the obligor was present during the perIod for 
which support was sought, and where, although the father's 
present domicile was not indicated by the record, he had ap-
parently left Georgia for good and made California his home 
and place of business. 
[2] Id.-Support-Contracts Affecting Child's Right to Support. 
-Civ. Code, § 139, relating to child support, and Civ. Code, 
§ 138, relating to child custody but also construed to govern 
[1] Reciprocal enforcement of duty to support dependents, con-
struction and application of state statutes providing for, note, 
42 A.L.R.2d 768. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Parent and Child, §§ 76, 77; 
Am.Jur., Parent and Child (1st ed §§ 35.1, 45). 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Parent and Child, § 29.5; [2] Parent 
and C-\lild, § 23; [3] Judgments, § 474(1}; Conflict of Laws, § 1 i 
[4]4ppeal and Error, § 27 . 
. , 
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orders for child support, preclude the rights of minor children 
to proper support from being abridged by any agreement be-
tween their parents. 
[3] Judgments-Sister States-Full Faith and Oredit-Purpose. 
-The purpose of the full faith and credit cla~e of the U.S. 
Constitution is to establish throughout the federal system the 
salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once 
pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of 
the parties in every other court as in that where the judg-
ment was rendered. 
[4] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Order Denying Relief Under 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.-The right 
to appeal from an order of a California court denying relief 
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1670 et seq) being governed by California 
law, the order is appealnble as a final judgment entered in a 
special proceeding in the superior court (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 963 sub.d.l). 
APPEAL from a judgment (order denying relief) of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County denying a petition for 
support for a minor child. H. Elliott Pownall, Court Com-
missioner, Judge pro tem. Reversed. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward M. Belasco 
and William L. Zessar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plain-
tiff and Appellant. 
Schuman, Novak & Cooper and Mark S. Novak for Defend-
ant and Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff appeals from an order denying 
her application for child support filed under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereafter URESA; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1670 etseq.). 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in New York on May 
4, 1956, and divorced in Georgia on July 31, 1957. Their 
daugllter, Kim Ivy, was born on April 19, 1957. "In lieu of 
permanent alimony," the judgment of divorce" incorporated 
in its entirety" the agreement made between the parties on 
July 3, 1957, "with reference to the support and mainte-
nance" of the plaintiff and her minor child. 
The agreement recited the parties' wish to have a "com-
plete and final scttlement" of their rights and obligations. 
Plaintiff received eustody of the child. Defendant agreed to 
deposit with It desigullted Georgia bunk, as trustee, the sum of 
j 
1 
) 
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$11,500 to form the corpus of a trust for the support of the 
child until she reached the age of 18 years, "in lieu of any 
claim which said child or the legal representative of said child 
now has or may hereafter be entitled to from her father or his 
estate for past, present and future support and maintenance, 
alimony or a year's support." The profits of the trust were 
to be applied by the trustee for the payment of $60 per month 
for the support of the child, and the corpus could be in\'aded 
under certain circumstances. In addition, defendant agreed to 
establish a trust of $2,500 for the sole purpose of providing a 
college education for the child. The parties agreed that "No 
changes in the financial condition or circumstances of the 
parties or of said minor shall authorize either of said parties 
and/or court to change or modify the terms or provisions of 
said flgreement or any judgment or decree that might be ren-
dered in any regard to any of' the matters set out in said 
agreement; the parties to this agreement having taken into 
consideration said changes of conditions or circumstances and 
also the possibility that an act or statute might be passed in 
the future authorizing the modification of any judgment or 
decree with reference to alimony. Said parties waive and 
renounce any rights which might accrue to them by virtue of 
any change or condition, or by virtue of any statute or law 
being passed that might grant to them rights that are not set 
out at the present time. " 
In 1965 plaintiff, residing in New York wit.h the ellild, 
initiatt·d proceedings pursuant to the URESA provisions of 
that state for an order directing defendant to provide "fair 
and reasonable" support of the dependent child. She did not 
allege any failure by defendant to comply with the divorce 
decree, but testified that she now required $750 per month for 
the support of the child. The New York court ordered the 
petition transmitted to the Superior Court of Los Angeles, 
where defendant resides, for proceedings under California's 
URESA provisions. That court denied the application for 
support "by reason of the lump sum settlement under the 
Georgia statute. " 
A 1955 Georgia statute provides that a judgment for ali-
mony may not be revised if it awards payment from the 
corpus of the husband's estate in lieu of weekly. monthly, 
annual or other periodie payments to tIle wife or child. (Ga. 
Code Ann. § 30-222; Daniel v. Daniel (1961) 216 Ga. 567 [118 
S.E.2d 369].) . 
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At the time the divorce decree incorporating the lump-sum 
settlement was rendered, however, the parties' duties were 
subject also to Georgia's URESA provisions enacted in 1956, 
superseded by substantially similar provisions in 1958. Under 
the 1956 statute, a duty to support dependent children is 
imposed upon a father "notwithstanding the fact" that he 
"has obtained in any Jtate or county a final decree of divorce 
or separation from his wife," and he "shall be deemed 
legally liable for the support under this Act of any dependent 
child of such marriage, whether or not there has been an 
award of alimony or support for said child .... " (Ga. Laws 
1956, URESA § 2(6) (a) ; see Ga. Code Ann. § 99.903 (a) (6) 
(a).) 
The act further provides that" Duties of support applicable 
under this Act are those imposed or imposable under .the laws 
of the State where the obligor was present during the period 
for which support is sought." (Ga. Laws 1956, URESA § 6; 
see Ga. Code Ann. § 99-907 (a.) Thus, if defendant were 
present in Georgia during the period for which support is 
sought, a Georgia court w()uld deny plaintiff's petition on the 
ground that under Georgia law a lump-sum settlement is con-
clusive upon the parties. 1 Clearly, however, the Georgia 
decree does not purport to deprive the courts of the obligor's 
residence' of the power to impose a duty of support in 
accordance with their law. (See Ehrenzweig, Interstate 
Recognition of Support Duties (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 382, 
394.)2 
1But see Barfield v. Harrison (1960) 101 Ga.App. 497 [114 ·S.E.2d 
802], requiring a father residing in Georgia to provide support under 
URESA notwithstanding a divorce decree providing for no support, on 
the ground that URESA affords all independent remedy. (There is no 
indication whether the decree was nonrnodifiable as a lump·sum settlement 
under Ga. Code Ann. I 30·222. The result may be explained n the ground 
that Georgia law permits a wife to obtain support for the child when the 
divorce decree fails to provide for any support. Tlwm/18 v. Thomas 
(1959) 215 Ga. 383 [110 S.E.2d 657].) 
2It is of no consequence that under URESA Georgia may continue to 
measure defendant's obligations within its borders under the decree, not-
withstanding a subsequent order of support. (" Any order of support" 
under URESA "shall not supersede any previous order of support issued 
in a divorce or separate maintenance action, but the amounts for a par-
ticular period pursuant to either order 811a11 be credited against amounts 
accruing or accrued for the same period under both." Ga. Laws 1956, 
URESA § 26; Ga. Code Ann. § 99-927(a).) Under this provision it is 
possible that Georgia need not enforce a subsequent URESA order of 
another state (see Howard v. Howard (1966) (Miss.) 191 .So.2d 528; 
De8pain v. Despain (1956) 78 Idaho ]85 [300 P.2d 500]), nor entertain 
an application for support based upon the law of the . father 's residence 
elsewhere, but no restraint would thereby be imposed upon the courts 
of that residence. 
) 
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[la] Whether defendant is subject to a duty of support 
imposed apart from, and notwithstanding the lump-sum 
settlement must therefore be determined in accordance with 
the law of California, his residence during the period for 
which such support is sought. Civil Code section 139 provides 
that" The provisions of any agreement for child support shall 
be deemed to be separate and severable from all other provi-
sions of such agreement relating to property and support of 
the wife or husband. . . . All ..• orders for child support, 
even when there has been an agreement between the parties on 
the subject of child support, may be modified or revoked at 
any time at the discretion of the court except as to any 
amount that may have accrued prior to the order of modifica-
tion. . . ." Although this provision was added in 1967 and . 
applies prospectively only, it codifies the law existing in 
1957-when the parties' agreement was made-insofar as it 
permits the upward modification of child support orders. In 
1957 Civil Code section 139 provided: "That portion of the 
decree or judgment making any such allowance or allowances 
[for the support or maintenance of a spouse or child] 
may be modified or revoked at any time at the discretion 
of . the court. . . ." . [2] Cases construing the effect of the 
statute upon integrated property agreements designed, as was 
the parties' agreement herein, to settle all rights and duties 
as to support as well, make it clear that "No such contract 
may, insofar as the children are concerned, abridge the power 
of the court . . . to provide for the support of the children." 
(Puckett v. Puckett (1943) 21 Cal.2d 833, 839 [136 P.2d 1] j 
see also NewhalZ v. Newhall (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 786 [321 
P.2d 818].) 
Moreover, Civil Code section 138, providing that in divorce 
~r separate maintenance actions the court may "make such 
order for the custody of such minor children as may seem 
necessary or proper and may at any time modify or vacate the 
same, " has been construed to govern orders for child support 
as well. (Sharpe v. Wesley (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 441 [177 
P.2d 802] j Allen v. Allen (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 706 [292 
P.2d 581] j see also Worthley v .. Worthley (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 
465,470 [283 P.2d 19J j Starr v. Starr (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 
633 [263 P.2d 675] j- Sampsell v. Superior Court (1948) 32 
Ca1.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739].) Thus, it has long been the law of 
this state that parents cannot abridge the right of their minor 
child to proper support by any agreement. (Merritt v. Merritt 
(1930) 106 Ca1.App. 234 [289 P. 240]; Rosher v. Superior 
I 
I 
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Court (1937) 9 Ca1.2d 556 [71 P.2d 918] .)3 That right has 
been enforced undcr uniform reciprocal support legislation 
notwithstanding the parents' divorce and any support provi-
sions in the decree. (Wh1"ttlrsey Y. Bellah (1955) 130 Cal.App. 
2d 182, 185 [278 P.2d 511] j Smith Y. Smith (1955) 131 Cal. 
App.2d 764, 769 [281 P.2d 274] j Smith v. Smith (1954) 125 
Cal.App.2d 154, 164 [270 P.2d 613].) 
[lb] Defendant contends, however, that under Yarbo-
rough v. Yarborough (1933) 290 U.S. 202 [78 L.Ed. 269, 54 
S.Ct. 181, 90 A.L.R. 924], California cannot impose; con-
sistent with the full faith and credit clause of the United 
States Constitution (art. IV, § 1 j 28 U.S.C. § 1738), any 
support obligation in excess of defendant's duty under the 
Georgia decree incorporationg the parties' agreement. In Yar-
borough, a Georgia decree incorporating a lump-sum settle-
ment for child support was final and nonmodifiable in that 
state. The child subsequently resided in South Carolina, 
where personal jurisdiction was acquired over the father, a 
Georgia resident, for the purpose of requiring him to support 
the child in accordance with South Carolina law. Over a 
vigorous dissent by Justice Stone, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that" the mere fact of [the child's] residence in South 
Carolina does not giyc that state thc power to impose such a 
duty upon tlie father who is not 11 resident and who long has 
beeu domiciled in Georgia. He has fulfilled the duty which he 
owes J1(>r by the Jaw of his domicile and the jUdgment of its 
court. Upou that judgment 11e is entitled to rely." (Yar-
b01'ough Y. Yarborough, supm, 290 U.S. at p. 212 [78 L.Ed. at 
p. 276].) 
'fhe Yarborough case is inapposite here. That decision was 
based upon the father's continued domicile and residence in 
Georgia. The court expressly reserved the question "whether 
South Carolina would have power to require the father, if he 
were domiciled there, to make further provision for the 
support, maintenance, or education of his daughter." (Ym·. 
bora-ugh v. Yarborough, supra, 290 U.S. at p. 213 [78 L.Ed. at 
p. 276].) The South Carolina court obtained jurisdiction by 
attachment of Yarborough's property, and only later was he 
served personally within that state. By contrast, defendant 
appears to have made California his home and place of busi· 
ness. Although the record does not indicate whether he has 
become a domiciliary of this state, clearly his substantial reJa· 
3Georgia's contrary local law is apparently unique. (See Ehrcnzweig. 
Conflict of Laws (1962) p. 280.) 
-) 
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tionship with it justifies the application of its law of support. 
Moreover, at the time of the Yarborough decision Georgia 
had not adopted the URESA provisions. The decree defend-
ant invokes, .however, was subject to that statute, which 
expressly reserves to the state of the obligor's residence the 
power to apply its law of support notwithstanding the decree. 
The decree therefore does not purport to govern defendant's 
obligations when he does not reside in Georgia. Thus, to hold 
that the decree bars the imposition of support duties in the 
circumstances of this case would give it greater credit than it 
claims for itself. The Constitution requires no such result. 
(Compare Magnolia Petroleum 00. v. Hunt (1943) 320 U.S. 
430 [88 L.Ed. 149, 64 S.Ct. 208, 150 A.L.R. 413], with Indus-
trial Oom. v. McOartin (1947) 330 U.S. 622 [91 L.Ed. 1140, 
67 8.Ct. 886, 169 A.L.R.1179].) 
[3] The purpose of the full faith and credit clause is to 
"establish throughout the federal system the salutary princi-
ple of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judg-
ment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in 
every other court as in that where the judgment was ren-
dered, ... " (Magnolia Petroleum 00. V. Hunt, supra, 320 
U.S. at p. 439 [88 L.Ed. at p. 155].) Thus the Constitution 
requires that judgments for alimony to a divorced wife that 
cannot be modified under the law of the rendering state, 
cannot be modified elsewhere. (Sistare V. Sistare (1910) 218 
U.S. 1 [54 L.Ed. 905, 30 S.Ct. 682, 28 L.R.A. N.S. 1068]; 
Barber v. Barber (1944) 323 U.S. 77 [89 L.Ed. 82, 65 S.Ct. 
137, 157 A.L.R. 163].) A divorce decree' incorporating child 
support provisions, however, does not terminate the relation-
ship of parent and child as it terminates the relationship of 
husband and wife. This case demonstrates why the divorce 
state should not be permitted to determine the welfare of the 
child for all time and in all states: More than ten years fol-
lowing the divorce, none of the parties appears to have any 
connection at all with Georgia; the mother and child reside in 
New York, and the fathcr resides in California.4 
Indeed, by the adoption of the reciprocal support legisla-
tion in almost all states (see 9C Unif. Laws Ann. 1 (1957», 
the federal system now espouses the principle that no state 
may freeze the obligations flowing from the continuing reIa-
4The Yarborough decision has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Reese 
and Johnson, The Scope 01 Full Faith and Credit to Judgments (19(9) 
49 Colum.L.Rev. 152, 175; Ehrenzweig, op. cit. 8'Upra, Con1l.ict of Laws 
pp. 205, 279·280; Stumberg, Con1lict of Laws (2d ed. 1951) p. 345; Note 
(1934) 47 HarvL.Rev. 712. 
:I. 
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tionship of parent and child. (See Howze v. Howze (D.C. 
1967) 225 A.2d 477; Allain v. Allain (1960) 24 Ill.App.2d 400 
[164 N.E.2d 611] ; Howard v. Howard (1966) (Miss.) 191 
So.2d 528; Moore v. Moore (1961) 252 Iowa 454 [107 N.W.2d 
97].) The states now share the power over that relationship 
to the extent of the obligor's presence in each-a modified 
version of the exception suggested by Yarborough in favor of 
the power of the obligor's domicile.5 (See also coneurring 
opinion of Justice Rutledge in Halvcy v, Halvey (1947) 
330 U.S. 610, 619 [91 L.Ed. 1133, 1138, 67 8.Ct. 903]; 
dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in K01Jacs v. 
Brewer (1958) 356 U.8. 604, 613 [2 'L.Ed.2d 1008, 1015, 78 
S.Ot. 963] ; Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and 
Credit to Judgmc'nts, supra, 49 Colum. L.Rev. 152, 178.) In 
deference to the clearly articulated national policy of preserv-
ing the flexibility of support obligations, Georgia has 
expressly refrained from demanding that its judgment lie con-
clusive elsewhere. The parties were therefore entitled to. rely 
upon that judgment in Georgia alone. 
[4] Plaintiff should be allowed to prove that. defendant 
has failed to provide fair and reasonable support for his 
child.6 The jUdgment is reversed. . 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
liThe "provider's domicile" rule has been criticized as permitting 
deserters to flock to no-duty havens. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Becog-
flition of Support Duties (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 382, 386. California's 
URESA version avoids that possibility by providing that "Duties of 
support . . . are those imposed or imposahle under the laws of any state 
where the alleged ohligor was present during the period for which sup-
port is sought or where the obligee was present when the failure to sup-
port commenced, at the election of the obligee." (Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 1670.) 
6Defendant contends that plaintiff may not appeal from the order deny-
ing relief by reason of article 3-A, section 38 of the New York Uniform 
Support of Dependents Law, which provides that" Any respondent in a 
proceeding brought under the provisions of this article shall have the 
same right of appeal as in civil proceedings or actions brought in the 
same court. Any order for support made by ·the court shall not be 
affected by an appeal b:lt shall continue in effect until th~ appeal is 
decided .•.. " We need riot consider defendant's contention under this 
provision, for plaintiff's }"ightto appeal. is g.overned.·iJYGitlifornia law. 
California's URESA contains no such provision. -The order 'denying relief 
is appealahle as n "final judgmcnt entered in .• '. [a) special" proceed-
ina-" in the superior court. (Code Civ. Proc", § 963, subd. 1.) .. 
i 
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